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Abstract 
Substantial evidence shows that North Americans are generally more ac-
cepting of the market than Europeans and attribute market outcomes to a 
larger degree to effort or skill. This article discusses the perceived fairness 
of layoffs and pay cuts in North America and Germany. We expect North 
Americans to be more accepting of layoffs and pay cuts than Germans and 
that procedures and conditions under which pay cuts or layoffs occur have 
a stronger impact on fairness perceptions for Germans than for North 
Americans. This hypothesis is tested using a quasi-experimental design. 
The empirical results are in line with our considerations. 
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1 Introduction 
The paper addresses the question: Do community standards of fairness in 
the employment relationship differ across countries? We briefly refer to 
evidence showing that North Americans are generally more accepting of 
the market and attribute more market outcomes to effort or skill than do 
most Europeans and then show that fairness perceptions are important for 
employment relations in both regions. We then discuss several labor mar-
ket institutions that might affect notions of fairness differently in the two 
regions. In view of the comparatively stronger market orientation in North 
America and the more encompassing regulation and institutional protec-
tion of the German labor market and the German employees we expect 
that notions of fairness are much stronger in Germany than in North 
America. The main contribution of the paper is an empirical comparison of 
fairness perceptions for several layoff and wage cut scenarios in Germany 
with the results of Charness and Levine (2000, 2002) for North America, 
using a quasi-experimental survey design. We find support for most of our 
hypothesis. 
2 The fairness of market outcomes: Transatlantic 
differences  
Recent research shows that U.S. citizens are much more acceptant of the 
market and market results than continental Europeans and among them 
Germans (Corneo 2000, Alesina and Angeletos 2005, Alesina, et al. 2005). 
The belief that income is determined by individual effort is more pervasive 
on the American side of the Atlantic. Corneo (2000) uses data of the In-
ternational Social Survey Programme (1992 Social Inequality II Module) to 
show that a substantially higher percentage of Americans (88%) respond 
“essential or very important” to the question “How important is hard work 
for getting ahead in life?” than western Germans (52%) or eastern Ger-
mans (71%) in the reunited Germany. Likewise only 38% of Americans 
strongly agree or agree with the statement “It is the responsibility of the 
government to reduce the differences in income between people with high 
incomes and those with low incomes” whereas 66% of West Germans and 
89% of East Germans conform. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) argue that 
differences in support for redistribution can be explained in part by “a dif-
ference in social perceptions regarding the fairness of market outcomes 
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and the underlying sources of income inequality”. For Americans poverty 
appears to be the result of bad choices or lack of effort while for Europe-
ans poverty is mainly due to bad luck or social injustice. Interestingly, 
Alesina and Angeletos (2003) attribute these transatlantic differences to 
historical antecedents. In Europe, class differences shaped opportunities 
for economic success for long periods more pervasively than ability and 
effort. In America - without the legacy of rigid classes - the social percep-
tion prevailed, that success in the labor market and the economy was due 
to effort and ability. 
In addition, comparing the roots of labor market institutions in the United 
States and Sweden, Agell (2002) argues that that unions, collective bar-
gaining, job protection and egalitarian pay structures originally emerged 
as defensive reaction to the menace of unemployment and income insecu-
rity. They arose due to needs of a social insurance of otherwise uninsur-
able risks and are not primarily and exclusively the outcome of rent seek-
ing by unions and insiders. The development of labor market institutions 
was, however, very different in the United States on the one hand and in 
Sweden, in fact in many European countries, on the other hand. To ex-
plain why institutions evolved differently Agell (2002), citing Keyssar 
(1986) suggests the role of massive foreign immigration in the United 
States. In an environment with multiple ethnic groups it was much more 
difficult to establish durable and encompassing labor market institutions 
than in the more homogeneous European labor markets.  
Apparently, a nation’s norms and values and specific historical paths influ-
ence its labor market institutions and laws. Thus, German laws hindering 
layoffs (described below) in many cases suggest that Germans place more 
value on employment security and fairness at work. In addition, in many 
cases people become adapted to what they see and consider it as fair. 
Again, the presence of laws hindering layoffs should suggest that Germans 
find layoffs less fair than North Americans. Thus, we hypothesize that 
Americans are more willing than Germans to assess (temporarily) nega-
tive labor market outcomes (layoffs and pay cuts) as fair. 
3 Fairness matters: Transatlantic commonalities 
In both North America and Germany psychological contracts are one im-
portant source of fairness perceptions in the employment relationship 
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(Anderson/Schalk 1998, Herriot et al. 1997, Hiltrop 1995, Millward/ 
Brewerton 2000, Rousseau 1995, Rousseau/Schalk 2000). These psycho-
logical contracts are often implicit agreements between employers and 
employees. Trust in these implicit obligations relies on the assumption 
that both parties fulfil their obligations (reciprocity). A one-sided violation 
of the contract implies erosion of trust and induces changes in behavior. 
Accordingly, psychologists (e.g. Rousseau 1995), sociologists (Barnard 
1938, Blau 1964) and more recently economists (e.g. Milgrom/Roberts 
1992, Williamson et al. 1975, Baker et al. 1988, Simon 1991) have hy-
pothesized that an employee’s productivity depends on her or his percep-
tion of the underlying social contract with the employer, as well as on nar-
row economic concerns. A worker who is dissatisfied may deliberately re-
strict output or even resort to sabotage. Conversely, an employee who 
feels he or she receives a fair deal is more likely to perform above any 
minimum requirements (Farh et al. 1990, Konovsky/Douglas 1994, Moor-
man 1991). 
Recent evidence supports the view that non-pecuniary considerations af-
fect productivity. Levine (1993) shows that in simulations compensation 
executives make decisions as if they believe fairness matters. Rabin 
(1993) surveyed the literature more broadly and suggests that reciprocity 
is an important norm in determining fairness - people do not usually be-
lieve it is fair when a person responds to gentle actions with harsh actions. 
Experimental evidence also supports this reasoning. Charness (1998), 
Fehr et al. (1993) and Fehr et al. (1998) are just some of the experiments 
showing that employees respond to higher (above-market) wages with 
higher effort, even in an anonymous environment where their reputation 
does not matter.  
As a result of the commonalities and differences summarized above we 
expect that fairness perceptions are important in the employment rela-
tionship in North America and in Germany, though to a lesser degree in 
North America.  
4 Country-specific institutional differences 
Schlicht (1998) argues that country-specific laws and institutions establish 
explicit and implicit rights, which manifest themselves in social norms and 
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habits. Similar, psychological contracts may vary in content and level 
across countries. For the topic investigated in this paper the relevant 
question is if certain institutions establish norms in favour of rigid pay and 
stable employment. In the following we will discuss protections against 
dismissals and the fall-back position of laid-off workers as well as wage 
determination systems. 
We will start discussing protection against dismissals: A comparison of 
relevant OECD-indicators (OECD 2004) shows that in this respect the U.S. 
labour market is less regulated than the Canadian one which in turn is 
subject to less regulation than the German labor market. For collective 
dismissals the extent of regulation is much stronger in all three countries 
than for layoffs of single employees. We will briefly describe the main fea-
tures of protection against dismissal in the three countries under consid-
eration: 
• In Germany the Protection against Dismissal Act applies to all employ-
ees in companies whose regular workforce exceeds 10 employees, who 
have been employed in this company for at least 6 months. If a works 
council exists, it has to be fully informed and consulted in all cases of 
dismissal. In 2000. 45.8 percent of Germans in the private sector work 
in establishments with a works council (Addison et al. 2003). The legal 
period of notice ranges between 2 weeks during the probationary period 
(maximum 6 months) to 7 months after 20 years of service. If “mass 
dismissals” occur, a company has to consider social issues like the dura-
tion of service in the company, age, obligations to pay maintenance and 
chances of re-employment. Employees charge their employers at the 
labour court relatively often. In most cases, however, the dismissed are 
primarily concerned with the amount of severance payment rather than 
with re-employment. 
• In contrast, as far as the United States is concerned, employment can 
be terminated by either party with or without a cause at any time; co-
determination rights do not exist. A certain protection against dismissal 
exists, however, for the relatively small proportion of employees who 
are members of trade unions because most collective agreements allow 
dismissals only for a just cause. Furthermore, Anti-Discrimination Acts 
provide some protection against dismissals for selected groups of em-
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ployees. Similar to Germany, evidence of deliberate discrimination can 
result in high payments of compensation or fines. 
• In Canada there has to be a good and sufficient cause for dismissals 
and the period of notice is 2 weeks for employees working at least for 3 
months in the company. Redundancy payment is regulated by law: Af-
ter one year’s length of employment dismissed employees receive two 
day’s pay for every year of service with the minimum compensation of 
five day’s pay. In case of charges courts rarely decide on re-employ-
ment, but rather determine compensatory payments. 
The fallback position of laid-off workers is determined in particular by the 
level and structure of unemployment, but also by institutions like the 
amount and duration of unemployment compensation. At the time of our 
surveys the unemployment rate in the United States was significantly 
lower than in Canada and Germany, where the unemployment rate in 
eastern Germany was twice as high as in western Germany. On the one 
hand employees might perceive dismissals or wage cuts as less fair in 
times of high unemployment than during less precarious labour market 
periods: The higher the regional unemployment rate the less likely it is to 
find a new job with similar employment conditions. On the other hand in-
dividuals might consider dismissals and wage cuts as rather normal, when 
unemployment has remained at a high level over a longer period of time. 
Moreover, the structure of unemployment could affect fairness considera-
tions. In Germany about half of the unemployed are longer than one year 
unemployed, compared to only 10% in the United States. This might im-
ply that even in times of high unemployment the groups of employees 
which are predominantly affected by unemployment (mainly older and un-
skilled workers) consider layoffs and wage cuts as most unfair. Duration 
and size of unemployment benefits also differs among the countries. In 
the United States benefits are lower and eligibility for benefits is shorter 
than in Germany.1
                                                
1 The protection of long-term unemployed workers in Germany declined in 2005, after 
our data were collected. 
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In addition to other factors the evaluation of wage cuts could be influ-
enced by wage-setting institutions. The system of industrial relations can 
implement explicit protection against wage cuts. In particular the bargain-
ing coverage rate is much higher than in Germany than in the United 
States: While in 1994 about 90% of employees in Germany work were 
covered by collective wage agreements, less than 20% of employees were 
covered by these contracts in the United States (Nickell et al. 2005). 
However, within Germany differences between the eastern and western 
part are noteworthy: In eastern Germany many local contracts allow pay 
reductions compared to the collectively negotiated wage. Accordingly, we 
presume that wage cuts are more likely to be accepted in the United 
States than in Germany, and that wage cuts within Germany might be 
more readily accepted in eastern Germany.  
Finally, the importance of internal labor markets differs between the 
United States and Germany. Hall (1982) estimated ten lifetime job 
changes for an American during his working career while male Germans 
hold an average of four lifetime jobs (Winkelmann 1994). The U.S. labor 
market rewards mobility and job matching whereas in the German labor 
market human capital and relative job stability are rewarded. Therefore, 
we presume that the relatively low mobility and comparatively high inter-
nal employment stability in Germany will have the effect that dismissals, 
in particular of workers with firm-specific qualifications, are perceived as 
less fair in Germany than in the United States. 
Summing up, in the light of these institutions and regulations of the labor 
market we expect that different countries will perceive the fairness of lay-
off and dismissals differently. Due to less protection against dismissals as 
well as higher probabilities of re-employment and mobility on the labour 
market in the United States and partly in Canada it can be presumed that 
dismissals and wage cuts in these countries will tend to be perceived as 
fairer than in Germany. The less generous unemployment compensation in 
North America probably makes layoffs less fair, but the lower levels of in-
surance themselves probably result from more favourable perceptions of 
the fairness of layoffs. This difference will be reinforced by German’s lower 
overall perceptions of fairness of markets and market outcomes. 
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Charness and Levine (2000, 2002), however, could hardly detect any 
country-specific differences in the perception of dismissals and wage cuts 
in their comparison between Silicon Valley and Canada. Taking into ac-
count this result and the preceding considerations we formulate the main 
hypothesis: The general acceptance of dismissals as well as wage cuts is 
lower in Germany than in the United States which is in part due to institu-
tional and regulatory differences. 
5 What affects perceptions of fairness concerning 
layoffs and pay cuts? 
Which factors might have an impact on fairness perceptions of layoffs? 
Several hypotheses concerning the source of shocks, company responses, 
and the characteristics of employees are discussed in detail by Charness 
and Levine (2000). The authors have already tested these hypotheses for 
North America using a quasi-experimental design that is based on a sce-
nario technique. A brief review of the composition of these scenarios - 
which laid also the groundwork for our German survey - and the related 
basic assumptions of fairness perceptions will be presented. 
What shocks justify layoffs? The scenarios examine three different shocks 
that reduce the employer's demand for labor:  
• Product market shock: “A company faced lower product demand due to 
shifts in the market; the viability of the employer is threatened.” 
• New technology: “A company has higher productivity due to the intro-
duction of some new technology.” 
• Employees’ suggestions: “A company has higher productivity due to the 
employees' suggestions.” 
In general, previous research suggests that people consider it fairer to re-
act to an exogenous shock than to take the initiative and cause harm 
(Rabin 1993). Along these lines, both Kahneman et al. (1986) and Brock-
ner (1992) found that external circumstances (e.g., a threat to the exis-
tence of the firm) led many people to consider pay cuts and layoffs as 
more fair. 
New technology is less exogenous to the employer than lower product 
demand. Thus, respondents should rate layoffs in response to the product 
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demand shock as fairer than those due to the technology shock. More-
over, new technology that raises productivity increases the employers' 
ability to pay. To the extent that perceptions of fairness involve the shar-
ing of rents and quasi-rents, layoffs due to the introduction of new tech-
nology should be perceived of as less fair than layoffs due to lower prod-
uct demand.  
Like new technology, employees' suggestions increase employers' ability 
to pay. Layoffs due to employees' suggestions have yet another reason to 
be perceived of as unfair: they violate the norm of reciprocity. The norm 
of reciprocity suggests that employers should respond to employee sug-
gestions with bonuses, not with layoffs. For respondents who share this 
view, layoffs for this reason should be even less fair than those due to 
new technology. 
How important is the mode of implementation a layoff? Our scenarios con-
sider two possible responses to a reduction in labor demand. 
• Gentle layoff: “The Company is laying off some employees. Before the 
layoff, the employer has given each employee four paid weeks to find 
another job elsewhere in the company. Those who cannot find a new 
position receive severance pay based on age and years of service. The 
company provided out placement assistance including counselling and 
résumé-writing workshops. Employees knew layoffs were likely in this 
circumstance.” 
• Harsh layoff: “The company is laying off employees with two weeks' 
warning. These are the first layoffs in the company's history.” 
The “gentle“ layoffs scenario is substantially more generous than the 
harsh layoff scenario. Brockner (1992), for example, notes that layoffs are 
perceived as more fair when the employer provides tangible care-taking 
services to help soften the blow. Moreover, the gentle layoffs scenario in-
cludes advanced notice, a form of respect that Brockner et al. (1994) ar-
gue will predict high perceptions of procedural justice.  
In addition, the literature on new employment contract (Levine et al. 
2002) predicts that gentle layoffs will generally be perceived as fair even 
in cases when the employer has high autonomy. Unlike harsh layoffs, re-
spondents will not consider these gentler layoffs as violating norms of re-
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ciprocity, even when employees have submitted productivity-enhancing 
ideas. For example, the severance pay may be interpreted as indicating 
that the employer is sharing some gains of higher productivity. This rea-
soning leads to a complementary hypothesis, that the type of shock 
makes little difference in how fairly respondents rate gentle layoffs.  
Do skill specificity and the occupation of laid-off workers affect fairness 
perceptions? We compare the following occupations and skill specificity 
(holding constant the tenure for laid-off workers): 
• Engineers: “Thus, the company is laying off some high-technology en-
gineers.“ 
• Production workers: “Thus, the company is laying off some production 
workers.“ 
• Firm-specific skills: “These workers are specialists in this company's u-
nusual technology, with an average of ten years tenure at this employ-
er.“ 
• General skills: “The affected engineers [production workers] have an 
average of ten years tenure at this employer and specialize in widely 
used hardware, so that their skills would be useful in another job.” 
Employees' costs of layoffs are higher when employees have employer-
specific skills than when they have skills that are widely useful (Becker 
1975). Consequently, a further hypothesis is that layoffs are fairer when 
the employees’ skills are useful in another job as compared to when they 
are specialists in the company's unusual technology.  
Although recent data suggest that layoff rates are converging, production 
employees in the United States still are more likely to be laid off than are 
professional employees (Farber 1996). Similarly, in Germany the risk of 
unemployment decreases with education (Reinberg and Hummel 2005). In 
societies, in which individual achievements justify differences in status, 
this should be evaluated as fair. Moreover, professionals typically have a 
higher-trust relationship with the employer, providing higher commitment 
and working with lower monitoring. In exchange, so goes the reasoning of 
the traditional employment contract, the employer is supposed to provide 
stable employment to this type of employee. Hence layoffs are perceived 
as more fair when they affect production workers instead of engineers. 
 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 1/2006   
 
14
Does the payment of CEO Bonuses affect fairness notions? The following 
scenarios are taken under consideration: 
• No mention. 
• CEO record bonus: “The CEO received a record bonus for his success in 
cutting costs.” 
• CEO refused bonus: “The CEO turned down his bonus this year because 
of the unexpected need for layoffs.” 
Theories of distributive justice often imply that lower-paid employees look 
to the fate of their higher-paid colleagues for fairness comparisons. In 
some cases, these comparisons rise to the highest ranks of the organiza-
tion (Cowherd/Levine 1992). Executive pay may be particularly salient 
during downsizing (Brockner 1992). 
Theories of procedural justice reinforce distributive concerns over relative 
outcomes (Bies et al. 1993). People are more likely to consider a decision 
fair, even if it harms them, if the decision-maker did not profit from it. 
Conversely, if a decision-maker profits from a decision that harms em-
ployees, the employees have reason to doubt the objective basis of the 
decision (Leventhal 1976). 
Finally, what evidence exists concerning community standards of fairness 
regarding pay cuts? In the mid 1980's, Kahneman et al. (1986) conducted 
a series of quasi experiments to investigate perceptions of fair treatment 
in Vancouver and Toronto. They found that reductions in wages for current 
employees due to slack labor markets were considered unfair much more 
frequently than were equally large reductions in wages for new employ-
ees. Furthermore, Kahneman et al. (1986) showed that economic shocks 
that reduce profits justify new wages, but that increases in market power 
do not. In a follow-up study Charness and Levine (2002) show that re-
spondents in the Silicon Valley were only slightly more accepting of pay 
cuts than Canadian interviewees. Comparing respondents from North 
America and Germany we expect stronger differences in the perceptions of 
pay cuts. The reason is again that North Americans are more acceptant of 
market outcomes and that labor market institutions, specifically collective 
wage contracts, specify wages in Germany which are perceived as fair. 
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6 Data and Method 
The North American survey (Charness/Levine 2000, 2002) was carried out 
in Vancouver and Toronto between March and September 1997 and in 
Silicon Valley between October 1997 and March 1998. There were around 
1000 Canadian and Silicon Valley respondents each. The German survey 
was conducted in the summer of 2004 and covered around 3000 respon-
dents. Note, that in translating the scenarios from English to German and 
designing the questionnaires we tried to ensure as much comparability as 
possible.  
We asked each respondent several questions about the fairness of layoffs 
and pay cuts in different scenarios. The questions concerning layoffs ex-
amined variations of a model case (Charness/Levine 2000):  
“A company faced lower product demand due to shifts in the market; the 
viability of the employer is threatened. In response, the company laid off 
some high-technology engineers. These workers are specialists in this 
company's unusual technology, with an average of ten years tenure at 
this employer. The company is laying off employees with two weeks' 
warning. These are the first layoffs in the company's history.” 
Respondents were then asked if the layoff was completely fair, somewhat 
fair, unfair, or very unfair (coded as 3 = completely fair, 2 = somewhat 
fair, 1 = unfair, 0 = very unfair). This model case was varied along a 
number of dimensions, to analyze how changes in the sources of the 
shocks to the employer, the reactions of the employer, the skills and oc-
cupations of the employees affected, and other factors had an impact on 
the respondents' perceptions of fairness.  
The questions on pay-cuts replicated some scenarios introduced by Kah-
neman et al. (1986). Following Charness and Levine (2002) only the cate-
gories fair (completely fair or somewhat fair) and unfair (unfair or very 
unfair) were distinguished (coded as 1 = fair, 0 = unfair). 
Note that comparison questions - questions matched on all aspects except 
one - were asked of different respondents. This between-subjects design 
minimizes respondents’ inclination and ability to answer based on their 
attempts to guess the researchers’ hypotheses. For each scenario around 
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130 ratings are available for the United States and for Canada, compared 
to about 300 observations for Germany. 
The comparison across countries is conducted by means of a regression 
analysis. We present effects of treatments for a baseline scenario and for 
different variations. We take the United States as the reference country 
and include Canadian and German interactions for all variables. For in-
stance, in the layoff scenarios, our baseline scenario is the one cited abo-
ve. The test statistic on the German interaction with the constant reveals 
if perceptions of the baseline scenario differ between the United States 
and Germany. The variable “gentle layoff” shows for the reference country 
if fairness perceptions vary with the mode of implementation in the United 
States. The coefficient of the German interaction with “gentle layoff” is the 
“double difference” indicating whether the mode of implementation mat-
ters more or less in Germany than in the United States. Our tables show 
the results of Ordinary Least Square estimates (which are easy to inter-
pret) as well as of ordered probit2 (which take account of the categorical 
nature of the dependent variable). Additionally, the tables display F-tests 
of the joint significance of the Canadian and of the German interactions, 
which indicate if there is a significant joint difference from U.S. responses.  
We distinguish between U.S. and Canadian citizens because we find signi-
ficant differences between both groups of North Americans. However, we 
do not find significant differences between western and eastern Germany. 
This is somewhat surprising because the regions of Germany were sepa-
rated for more than 40 years. Eastern Germany had a communist eco-
nomic system for several decades until the unification in 1990. In fact, as 
already has been mentioned, Corneo (2000) finds some differences in the 
acceptance of the market between western and eastern Germany. To test 
whether the respondents in the two regions were similar because younger 
worker were not influenced by the old regime we replicated the compari-
son for workers born before 1970. Again, the analysis revealed no signifi-
cant differences. Therefore the following analysis does not distinguish be-
tween the regions of Germany. 
                                                
2 Because we are not interested in the thresholds themselves, the estimated cutpoints 
from the ordered probit estimates are not documented in the Tables. The estimated 
coefficients can be obtained from the authors on request.  
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7 Empirical results for the layoff scenarios 
Summary statistics are in the Appendix. Table 1 presents a regression 
analysis of impact factors on fairness perceptions of layoffs. 
Table 1: Fairness perceptions of layoffs  
0 = very unfair, 1 = unfair, 2 = somewhat fair, 3 = fair 
(Probability values from two-sided t-tests in parentheses) 
 Ordinary Least Squares Ordered Probit#
  Canadian German  Canadian German 
  Interactions  Interactions 
Constant 1,036 ** -0,027  0,094  -  -0,028  0,108  
 (0,00)  (0,73)  (0,12)    (0,79)  (0,17)  
New technology 0,087  -0,231 * -0,306 ** 0,114  -0,331 ** -0,399 ** 
 (0,09)  (0,01)  (0,00)  (0,09)  (0,01)  (0,00)  
Employee's suggestions -0,180 ** -0,180  -0,054  -0,260 ** -0,252  -0,039  
 (0,01)  (0,07)  (0,50)  (0,00)  (0,06)  (0,71)  
Gentle layoff 1,074 ** 0,373 ** -0,503 ** 1,384 ** 0,524 ** -0,667 ** 
 (0,00)  (0,00)  (0,00)  (0,00)  (0,00)  (0,00)  
Production worker 0,091  -0,033  -0,067  0,113  -0,053  -0,084  
 (0,17)  (0,78)  (0,41)  (0,20)  (0,73)  (0,42)  
General skills 0,077  -  0,206 * 0,090  -  0,260 * 
 (0,25)    (0,01)  (0,30)    (0,01)  
CEO refused bonus 0,397 ** -  -0,223 ** 0,489 ** -  -0,265 * 
 (0,00)    (0,01)  (0,00)    (0,01)  
CEO record bonus -0,176 ** -  -0,096  -0,256 ** -  -0,113  
 (0,01)    (0,23)  (0,00)    (0,29)  
Adjusted R2 / Pseudo R2 0,211      0,091      
F-Test on joint signifi-
cance (probability value)   0,000  0,000    0,000  0,000  
Observations 1715  853  3918  1715  853  3918  
Sum of observations 6486      6486      
*) pt = 0,05, 
**) pt = 0,01. 
#) Estimated thresholds are not displayed. 
Reference scenario: U.S. respondents, product market shock, engineers, 10 years tenure, firm-
specific skills, harsh layoff. 
 
First, how important is the kind of shock causing the layoffs? The theoreti-
cal prediction was that layoffs are perceived as most fair with lower prod-
uct market demand, less fair stemming from the introduction of a new 
technology and least fair if they are the result of employees’ suggestions 
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that increased productivity. The empirical results show that layoffs follow-
ing employees’ suggestions are in fact considered as the most unfair sce-
nario in the United States, while no significant difference is found between 
the two other types of shock. Significantly different perceptions by Cana-
dians or Germans are detected only for layoffs due to the introduction of a 
new technology, which are perceived as significantly more unfair than in 
the United States. This result is consistent with the general perception 
that the on-going process of technological change is more accepted in the 
latter, particularly as our U.S. sample is drawn from Silicon Valley (the 
host of much technological change). 
Second, the response of the company to the shock seems to be most cru-
cial for the fairness perception of layoffs. Harsh layoffs are judged as 
rather unfair for all kinds of shocks and in all three countries under con-
sideration. Generally, gentle layoffs are found to be significantly fairer (by 
about 1.1 points on a 0 to 3 scale in the United States, 1.4 in Canada, but 
only 0.6 in Germany). In addition to the preceding explanation higher un-
employment benefits as well as a stronger protection against dismissal in 
Germany might explain the lower importance of employer response in 
Germany. 
Third, does it make a difference which occupation and which skill specific-
ity characterizes laid-off workers? Regarding occupation fairness ratings 
do not differ significantly between engineers and production workers for 
all three countries. Turning to skill specificity (which has not been consid-
ered in the Canadian survey), in the United States fairness ratings do not 
vary much between laid-off workers with general or specific skill. Con-
versely, in Germany lay-offs of workers with specific skills are rated as 
more than 0.2 points more unfair than dismissals of workers with general 
skills.  
Fourth, the role of CEO bonuses is compared for the United States and 
Germany (these scenarios has not been asked in the Canadian survey). In 
both countries dismissals are perceived as more fair in comparison to the 
reference scenario, when the CEO refused to obtain a bonus for successful 
cost-cutting. However, the refusal of the bonus payment improves fair-
ness ratings twice as much in the United States (0.4 points) than in Ger-
many (less than 0.2). Furthermore the reference scenario is evaluated as 
 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 1/2006   
 
19
significantly more fair compared to a situation where the CEO obtains an 
extra bonus for cost-cutting; the size of the effect does not differ signifi-
cantly between the United States and Germany. 
8 Empirical results for the pay-cut scenarios 
Table 2 compares scenarios describing wage-cuts in a situation with high 
regional unemployment. In the reference scenario, where the company 
makes profit, fairness ratings are rather low (fewer than 37% rated the 
action as “fair” in all nations). No significant difference between fairness 
perceptions in the United States and Germany is found; Canadians, how-
ever, rate wage-cuts as significantly more unfair in this situation.  
Table 2: Wage cuts for companies making versus losing money 
Probability values from two-sided t-tests in parentheses) 
0 = unfair, 1 = fair 
 Ordinary Least Squares Probit 
  Canadian German  Canadian German
  Interactions  Interactions 
Constant 0.368 -0.125 ** -0.055 -0.338 -0.358 -0.150
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.26) (0.00) (0.02) (0.26)
Company loses money 0.359 0.062 -0.121 0.941 0.179 -0.326
(not makes profit) (0.00) (0.45) (0.08) (0.00) (0.43) (0.09)
Adjusted R2 / Pseudo R2 0.108 0.083  
F-Test on joint significance 
of difference from U.S. 
responses (probability 
value) 0.049 0.001 0.042 0.001
Observations 280 209 619 280 209 619
Sum of observations 1155 1155  
*) pt < 0.05, 
**) pt < 0.01. 
Reference scenario: U.S. respondents, small company, substantial unemployment, company makes 
profit, wages reduced by 5 percent 
 
In all three countries pay-cuts are perceived as fairer if the company loses 
money than if the company makes money (replicating Kahneman et al. 
1986). Their interpretation is that a firm is allowed to protect itself against 
losses at a transactor’s expense. Acting at someone else’s cost is, how-
ever, not accepted in a situation with positive profits. Still, the results in-
dicate that wage-cuts are perceived as more unfair (although only signifi-
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cant at the 10-percent-level) in Germany than in North America if the 
company loses money. In addition to the more wide-spread market scep-
ticism in Germany, collective contracts set wages which are generally 
rated as fair and which generate both nominal and real wage rigidity 
(Pfeiffer 2003). 
Table 3 compares pay cuts for current workers with the payment of lower 
starting wages for newly hired workers. Wage cuts are generally not per-
ceived as very fair in the reference scenario, where wages are cut for a 
current worker, and they are rated as significantly more unfair in Germany 
than in North America. Furthermore, lower wages for a new worker (re-
placement) are generally much more acceptable than wage cuts for in-
cumbents. Kahneman et al. (1986) interpret this in the sense that an enti-
tlement to a reference wage does not carry over to a new transaction. En-
titlements for new hires, however, seem to be much less pronounced in 
North America than in Germany. This might again be a hint that institu-
tional wage setting arrangements in Germany have an impact on fairness 
perceptions. 
Table 3: Wage cuts for current employee versus new hire 
(Probability values from two-sided t-tests in parentheses) 
0 = unfair, 1 = fair 
 Ordinary Least Squares Probit 
  Canadian German  Canadian German 
  Interactions  Interactions 
Constant 0.333 ** 0.036  -0.177 ** -0.431 ** 0.098  -0.579 **
 (0.00)  (0.50)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.54)  (0.00)  
Wage reduced for new hire 0.338 ** 0.054  -0.206 ** 0.874 ** 0.171  -0.423 * 
(not current employee) (0.00)  (0.49)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.47)  (0.03)  
Adjusted R2 / Pseudo R2 0.175      0.138      
F-Test on joint significance 
of difference from U.S. re-
sponses (probability value)   0.218  0.000    0.247  0.000  
Observations 284  224  588  284  224  588  
Sum of observations 1096      1096      
*) pt < 0.05, 
**) pt < 0.01. 
Reference scenario: U.S. respondents, small company, business satisfactory, unemployment in-
creased, wages reduced for current worker. 
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Finally, the framing of the wage cut is investigated in Table 4. The refer-
ence scenario, where wages are reduced, is rated as rather unfair in all 
three countries, with no significant differences between them. However, in 
North America as well as in Germany it is perceived as much fairer if a 
bonus is eliminated than if the wage is reduced by an equal amount (as in 
Kahneman et al. 1986). In Germany the framing as a bonus-elimination 
seems to be even more decisive for fairness ratings than in North Amer-
ica. One reason might be that bonus payments play a more important role 
in wage-setting in the United States and Canada and that the fairness 
perceptions induced by the German wage setting system do not carry over 
to bonus payments. 
Table 4: Cutting base pay versus bonus 
(Probability values from two-sided t-tests in parentheses)  
0 = unfair, 1 = fair 
 Ordinary Least Squares Probit 
  Canadian German  Canadian German 
  Interactions  Interactions 
Constant 0.392 ** -0.108  -0.071  -0.274 ** -0.296  -0.190  
 (0.00)  (0.07)  (0.14)  (0.01)  (0.07)  (0.14)  
10 percent bonus elimi-
nated 0.198 ** 0.077  0.138 * 0.503 ** 0.218  0.368 * 
 (0.00)  (0.38)  (0.05)  (0.00)  (0.35)  (0.05)  
Adjusted R2 / Pseudo R2 0.087      0.067      
F-Test on joint signifi-
cance of difference from 
U.S. responses (probabil-
ity value)   0.177  0.136    0.175  0.137  
Observations 275  266  614  275  266  614  
Sum of observations 1108      1108      
*) pt < 0.05, 
**) pt < 0.01 
Reference scenario: U.S. respondents, small company, business has not increased as before, wages 
reduced by 10 percent. 
 
9 Conclusions 
A main finding of our comparisons is that dismissals are perceived as less 
fair in the vast majority of scenarios in Germany than in the United States 
and Canada. In our opinion this finding can be explained by differences in 
the social perception of the market and market outcomes and by differ-
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ences in specific institutional labor market arrangements which establish 
explicit and implicit rights and express themselves - as has been argued 
by Schlicht (1998) - in country-specific social norms and habits. The sce-
narios show in detail: 
• Harsh layoffs are perceived as rather unfair in Germany as well as in the 
North America. Gentle layoffs, however, exert a much stronger impact 
on fairness perceptions in North America than in Germany. This might 
partly be due to lower benefits and less social protection during unem-
ployment in North America.  
• Which occupational group is affected by a dismissal - production work-
ers or engineers - hardly influences the fairness perceptions in all three 
countries. Laying-off workers with general skills is perceived as more 
fair compared to dismissing workers with specific skills in Germany, but 
not in North America. An explanation might be that internal labor mar-
kets in Germany are connected with reduced chances of reemployment 
in other firms and with risks of long-term unemployment for workers 
with firm-specific human capital.  
• In all regions fairness ratings of layoffs are very low when the CEO re-
ceives a bonus for cost-cutting. Acceptance, however, increases, when 
the bonus is refused, and this effect is even stronger in the United 
States than in Germany.  
The wage-cutting scenarios show that wage-cuts tend to be perceived as 
less unfair in North America than in Germany. We would like to highlight 
the following results: 
• In all three countries wage-cuts are treated as fairer when the company 
incurs losses and is not profitable. This reinforces the finding from the 
literature, that the cause of a wage-cut is important for its assessment.  
• It is more acceptable if newly hired workers receive a lower wage than 
to cut wages of incumbents in the three countries. However, both pro-
cedures appear to be less accepted in Germany than in North America. 
If so, this implies that the employment relationship constitutes stronger 
entitlements and psychological contracts in Germany. 
• Finally, the elimination of bonus payments is perceived as fairer than 
wage-cuts of an equal amount in the three countries. Cancelling a bo-
nus is more acceptable in Germany; probably because bonus payments 
 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 1/2006   
 
23
are less widespread than in North America and apparently they are not 
covered by the norms induced by the German wage setting system.  
Summing up, our results show a number of significant differences in fair-
ness ratings across the United States, Canada and Germany. These differ-
ences can be traced to fundamental and differing social perceptions con-
cerning the acceptability of the market and market outcomes and go hand 
in hand with differences in institutional labor market arrangements that 
have an impact on the evolvement of social norms and psychological con-
tracts within countries. 
These results are important in understanding the evolution of labor mar-
ket institutions and outcomes across different regions. Many authors pos-
ited that German labor market institutions such as apprenticeship were 
important factors in explaining Germany’s rapid growth in the generation 
prior to 1973. Many authors (sometimes overlapping the first group) pos-
ited that German labor market institutions such as widespread coverage 
by collective bargaining were important factors in explaining Germany’s 
relative slow job growth in the generation after 1973. To the extent both 
labor market outcomes and institutions shape citizens’ beliefs in the fair-
ness of certain employment contracts, this history can affect the ability of 
the economic system to adopt new employment institutions (Alesina and 
Angeletos 2005). For example, Germans’ lower average acceptance of pay 
cuts during slack labor markets for new hires as well as for current incum-
bents (Table 3) may partly be the result of collective bargaining. At the 
same time, once such norms are established they can reduce the effects 
of legal or bargaining changes that might increase wage flexibility in other 
settings.  
A single cross-sectional study cannot determine the complex interplay of 
institutions, laws, beliefs and labor market outcomes. Future studies can 
build on this by examining the interplay of these forces in more nations 
over longer periods of time.  
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Scenario means for the layoff scenarios 
0 = very unfair, 1 = unfair, 2 = somewhat fair, 3 = fair 
 U.S.A Canada Germany
Product market shock, engineers, 10 years tenure, firm-
specific skills, harsh layoff 0.98 0.92 1.14 
Product market shock, engineers, 10 years tenure, firm-
specific skills, gentle layoff 2,12 2,55 1.72 
Product market shock, engineers, 10 years tenure, general 
skills, harsh layoff 1.14 - 1.47 
Product market shock, production worker, 10 years tenure, 
firm-specific skills, harsh layoff 1.15 1.07 1.21 
Product market shock, production worker, 10 years tenure, 
general skills, harsh layoff 1.18 - 1.39 
Product market shock, engineers, 10 years tenure, firm-
specific skills, harsh layoff, CEO refused bonus 1.41 - 1.24 
Product market shock, engineers, 10 years tenure, firm-
specific skills, hash layoff., CEO record bonus 0.90 - 0.84 
New technology, engineers, 10 years tenure, firm-specific 
skills, harsh layoff 1.03 0.93 0.83 
New technology, engineers, 10 years tenure, firm-specific 
skills, gentle layoff 2,30 2,25 1.48 
New technology, engineers, 10 years tenure, firm-specific 
skills, harsh layoff, CEO refused bonus 1.54 - 1.15 
New technology, engineers, 10 years tenure, firm-specific 
skills, harsh layoff, CEO record bonus 0.91 - 0.65 
Employees’ suggestions, engineers, 10 years tenure, firm-
specific skills, harsh layoff 0.96 0.69 0.91 
Employees’ suggestions, engineers, 10 years tenure, firm-
specific skills, gentle layoff. 1.82 2,05 1.45 
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Table A.2: Scenario means for the wage-cut scenarios 
0 = unfair, 1 = fair 
 U.S.A Canada Germany
Small company, substantial unemployment, company 
makes profit, wages reduced by 5 percent 0.37 0.24 0.31 
Small company, substantial unemployment, company  
loses money, wages reduced by 5 percent 0.73 0.66 0.55 
Small photocopying shop, business satisfactory, unem-
ployment increased, wages reduced for current worker 0.33 0.37 0.16 
Small photocopying shop, business satisfactory, unem-
ployment increased, wages reduced for replacement 0.67 0.76 0.29 
Small company, business has not increased as before, 
wages reduced by 10 percent 0.39 0.28 0.32 
Small company, business has not increased as before, 
usual 10 percent yearly bonus eliminated 0.59 0.56 0.66 
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